# 1NC vs Minnesota MK

## Off

### 1NC – Topicality

#### Our interpretation is that the resolution should define the division ground. It was negotiated and announced in advance providing both teams a reasonable opportunity to prepare. Only a textual reading of the resolution provides a predictable basis for research.

#### This does not exclude performance, dictate evidence type, or assume the judge’s role – only that the topic should determine the debate’s subject matter.

#### USFG means the three branches.

OECD, 1987. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. *The Control and Management of Government Expenditure*. 179. Google Book.

1. Political and organizational structure of government

The United States America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information).

The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### ‘Resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases, 1964. Permanent Edition.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### The core antitrust laws are The Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act.

Thomas Horton 10. Professor of Law and Heidepriem Trial Advocacy Fellow, University of South Dakota School of Law. “Rediscovering Antitrust's Lost Values.” The University of New Hampshire Law Review. https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1305&context=unh\_lr

Part II of this Article discusses Congress’s historical balancing and blending of fundamental political, social, moral, and economic values to create a constitutional-like set of flexible laws that can be adapted to unforeseen and changing economic and political circumstances.22 Part II.A. briefly reviews some of the extensive scholarship addressing Congress’s balancing of values and objectives in its core antitrust laws including the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts. Parts II.B. and C. explore the less-studied balancing of political, social, moral, and economic values and objectives in more recent antitrust legislation.23 Part II.B. specifically examines the legislative debates undergirding the passage of the HSR Act. 24 Part II.C. then turns to the debates and discourse that led to the passage of the NCRA in 1984 and the subsequent National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 and 2004. 25

#### Violation---they don’t defend USFG action that substantially expands the scope of its core antitrust laws – vote neg

#### 1. Competition – the Neg should win on average 50 percent of the time – any unfair advantage is a reason they should lose – their arguments are shaped by the drive to win, so presume their arguments are in bad faith.

#### 2. Clash – debate requires stasis to motivate research that develops third and fourth line responses – that’s key to politics and activism regardless of your personal beliefs – their interp explodes limits, makes the Aff conditional, and forces the Neg into concessionary ground.

### Cap K

#### Individualized survival, resistance, and intimacy all operate within market forces

Sicar and Jain 12 (Oishik Sircar – Assistant Professor and Assistant Director, Centre for Penology, Criminal Justice and Police Studies; Coordinator, Collaborative Research Programme on Law, Postcoloniality and Culture, Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, India, and Dipika Jain – Assistant Professor and Assistant Dean (Student Initiatives); Executive Director, Centre for Health Law, Ethics and Technology, Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, India, “New Intimacies/ Old Desires: Law, Culture and Queer Politics in Neoliberal Times,” August 2012, 4 Jindal Global L. Rev. 1, accessed 1-30-15 //Bosley)

Neoliberalism is the proverbial elephant in the room when it comes to liberal discourses on queer emancipation. There are several political-economy definitions of what it is and why it is dangerous, n40 but we would like to work with a tentative definition that understands neoliberalism as 'the cultural technology of disciplining conduct'. While capitalism as an ideology puts into operation a political formation of governance like liberalism, neoliberalism is the condition where practices of liberalism get naturalised, internationalised and internalised by individuals who inhabit liberal or liberal-aspiring state formations. Culturally, neoliberalism has very smoothly done three things to ensure its robust and brutal longevity: first, it has enabled the mutation of the state into a firm; second, it has given birth to the responsibilised and self-governing citizen; third, it has constantly projected experiences [\*12] of human precarity and risk as entrepreneurial/ developmental/ funding opportunity. These three ramifications of neoliberalism on human minds and bodies have had arresting consequences on the idea and practice of legally claiming LGBTI rights. n41 The new mantra of citizenship under neoliberalism is one where every individual is told that they can be citizens with rights as long as they perform certain prescribed codes of respectable citizenship which are for their own good. Under neoliberalism, the script of this seduction is not a preserve of the state any longer but authored under the demands of transnational market forces. The promise of integration is a difficult temptation to resist for those who have historically been outside of the folds of formal citizenship. Not being integrated is to not be treated as a citizen with rights and being incorporated into the folds of citizenship might afford you rights but those rights also result in initiating a unique form of self-surveillance and regulatory technology. Pharmakon redux. So what exactly does the seduction of the state/ market complex do to the queer person? As Jasbir Puar in her reading of the situation in the US notes: [T]here is a transition under way in how queer subjects are relating to nation-states, particularly the United States, from being figures of death (i.e., the AIDS epidemic) to becoming tied to ideas of life and productivity (i.e., gay marriage and families). The politics of recognition and incorporation entail that certain -- but certainly not most -- homosexual, gay and queer bodies may be the temporary recipients of "the measures of benevolence" that are afforded by liberal discourses of multicultural tolerance and diversity. This benevolence towards sexual others is contingent upon ever-narrowing parameters of white racial privilege, consumption capabilities, gender and kinship normativity, and bodily integrity. n42 The experience in India will not be very different where Naz marks this flashpoint moment of integration and it will not come as a surprise if the terms of recognition for queer subjects are predicated on the hegemonic constructs of the Hindu nation, the heteronormative Indian family and the universal image of the chic, entrepreneurial and consumer citizen -- one who is both culturally and economically disciplined to serve the ends of neoliberalism. Brenda Cossman pithily captures the characteristics that this newly crowned sexual citizen will fashion: [\*13] They are experts in the arts of self-conduct. And they shop. Their citizenship is sexualized beyond heterosexuality, commodified through a celebration of market consumption, and domesticated through a new emphasis on the intimate sphere not only as a site for caring for others but for care of the self. They are citizens who are sexed but not too much; citizens who not only consume but better yet, teach each other to do so; citizens devoted to the conduct of self and other improvement [...] The process of becoming citizens is one that operates its own technologies of inclusion and exclusion and constitutes subjectivities through these technologies. I argue that the new modality of sexual citizenship is one that is privatized, domesticated and self-disciplined. n43

#### State Denialism link turns case – reinscribes public/private distinction which solidify the free market while reproducing gender binaries

McCluskey 8 – Professor of Law and William J. Magavern Faculty Scholar at SUNY Buffalo Law (Martha, “How Queer Theory Makes Neoliberalism Sexy,” in Feminist and Legal Queer Theory: Intinimate Encounters, Uncomfortable Conversations edited by Martha Fineman, Jack Jackson, and Adam Romero, p131-133, accessed 2-4-15 //Bosley)

Queer theory's anti-moralism works together with its anti-statism to advance not simply "politics," but a specific vision of good "politics" seemingly defined in opposition to progressive law and morality. This anti-statist focus distinguishes queer theory from other critical legal theories that bring questions of power to bear on moral ideals of justice. Kendall Thomas (2002), for example, articulates a critical political model that sees justice as a problem of "power, antagonism, and interest," (p. 86) involving questions of how to constitute and support individuals as citizens with interests and actions that count as alternative visions of the public. Thomas contrasts this political model of justice with a moral justice aimed at discovering principles of fairness or institutional processes based in rational consensus and on personal feelings of respect and dignity. Rather than evaluating the moral costs and benefits of a particular policy by analyzing its impact in terms of harm or pleasure, Thomas suggests that a political vision of justice would focus on analyzing how policies produce and enhance the collective power of particular "publics" and "counterpublics" (pp. 91—5). From this political perspective of justice, neoliberal economic ideology is distinctly moral, even though it appears to be anti-moralist and to reduce moral principles to competition between self-interested power. Free-market economics rejects a political vision of justice, in this sense, in part because of its expressed anti-statism: it turns contested normative questions of public power into objective rational calculations of private individual sensibilities. Queer theory's similar tendency to romanticize power as the pursuit of individualistic pleasure free from public control risks disengaging from and disdaining the collective efforts to build and advance normative visions of the state that arguably define effective politics. Brown and Halley (2002), for instance, cite the Montgomery bus boycott as a classic example of the left's problematic march into legalistic and moralistic identity politics. In contrast, Thomas (2002) analyzes the Montgomery bus boycott as a positive example of a political effort to constitute a black civic public, even though the boycott campaign relied on moral language to advance its cause, because it also emphasized and challenged normative ideas of citizenship (p. 100, note 14). By glorifying rather than deconstructing the neoliberal dichotomy between public and private, between individual interest and group identity, and between demands for power and demands for protection, queer theory's anti-statism and anti-moralism plays into a right-wing double bind. In the current conservative political context, the left appears weak both because its efforts to use state power get constructed as excessively moralistic (the feminist thought police, or the naively paternalistic welfare state) and also because its efforts to resist state power get constructed as excessively relativist (promoting elitism and materialism instead of family values and community well-being). The right, on the other hand, has it both ways, asserting its moralism as inherent private authority transcending human subjectivity (as efficient market forces, the sacred family, or divine will) and defending its cultivation of self-interested power as the ideally virtuous state and market (bringing freedom, democracy, equality to the world by exercising economic and military authoritarianism). From Egalitarian Politics to Renewed Conservative Identity Queer theory's anti-statism and anti-moralism risks not only reinforcing right-wing ideology, but also infusing that ideology with energy from renewed identity politics. Susan Fraiman (2003) analyzes how queer theory (along with other prominent developments in left academics and culture) tends to construct left resistance as a radical individualism modeled on the male "teen rebel, defined above all by his strenuous alienation from the maternal" (p. xii). Fraiman observes that this left vision relies on "a posture of flamboyant unconventionality [that] coexists with highly conventional views of gender [and] is, indeed, articulated through them" (p. xiii). Fraiman links recent left contempt for feminism to a romantic vision of "coolness ... epitomized by the modem adolescent boy in his anxious, self-conscious and theatricalized will to separate from the mother" who is by definition uncool—controlling, moralistic, sentimental and not sexy. (p. xii). Even though queer theory distinguishes itself from feminism by repudiating dualistic ideas of gender, its anti-foundationalism covertly promotes an essentialist "binary that puts femininity, reproduction, and normativity on the one hand, and masculinity, sexuality, and queer resistance on the other" (p. 147). This binary permeates queer theory's condemnation of "governance feminism." (Brown and Halley, 2002; Wiegman, 2004) a vague category mobilizing images of the frumpy, overbearing, unexciting, unfunny, and not-so-smart "schoolmarm" (Halley, 2002) whose authority will naturally be undermined when real "men" appear on the scene. Suggesting the importance of gender conventions to the term's power, similar phrases do not seem to have gained comparable academic currency as a way to deride the complex regulatory impact of other specific uses of state authority -for instance postmodernists do not seem to widely denounce "governance anti-racism," "governance socialism," "governance populism," "governance environmentalism" or "governance masculinism" (though Brown and Halley do criticize progressive law reform more generally with the term "governance legalism" (p. 11)).

#### Capitalism ensures climate apartheid and extinction

Heron & Dean 20 (Kai Heron, editor at ROAR Magazine. Jodi Dean, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. “Revolution or Ruin.” E-Flux. Journal #110 - June 2020. <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/110/335242/revolution-or-ruin/> //shree)

We know how the first paragraph begins. We’ve read about the changing climate for over twenty years, infrequently at first and then daily until we couldn’t deny it any longer. The world is burning. The oceans are heating up and acidifying. Species are dying in the Sixth Great Extinction. Koalas have replaced polar bears as the charismatic species whose dwindling numbers bring us to tears. Millions are displaced and on the move, only to be met with fences, borders, and death.

We’ve read the news and it keeps getting worse. As pandemics spread, as the climate crisis continues unabated, the imperatives of capital prevent state action on anything but protecting banks and corporations. Since 1988, when human-induced climate change was officially recognized by the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the oil and gas sector has doubled its contribution to global warming. The industry emitted as much greenhouse gas over the twenty-eight years after 1988 as it had in the 237 years since the beginning of the industrial age. Regular reports announce that the atmospheric impact of these emissions is manifesting faster than scientists previously expected. The IPCC clock tells us that we have eleven years to prevent warming from rising more than 1.5 degrees above preindustrial levels. Some places on earth already hit that mark in the summer of 2019. “Climate change”—that innocuous moniker preferred by Republican political consultant Frank Lutz and adopted by the George W. Bush administration because “global warming” seemed too apocalyptic—has moved from seeming far away and impossible to being here, now, and undeniable. This has not stopped the United States and Canada from providing economic relief funds in the wake of coronavirus to oil and gas companies.

Those least responsible for climate change, those who have suffered the most from capitalism’s colonizing and imperial drive, are on the frontlines of the climate catastrophe. How to find clean water amidst never-ending drought? How to gather needed herbs, food, and firewood amidst rapid deforestation? How to survive the floods and fires? Centuries of colonialism, exploitation, and war undermine people’s capacities to survive and thrive, hitting poor people, women, children, people with disabilities, already disadvantaged racialized and national minorities, and the elderly hardest of all. According to a UN report, “We risk a ‘climate apartheid’ scenario where the wealthy pay to escape overheating, hunger and conflict while the rest of the world is left to suffer.” Capitalism has always permitted some to flourish by forcing others to fight for survival. The climate crisis—and now the coronavirus—intensifies these dynamics into a global class war. In Marx’s words, “ruin or revolution is the watchword” for our times.

#### Vote neg for climate Leninism – power must not be smashed, it should be wrested

Heron & Dean 20 (Kai Heron, editor at ROAR Magazine. Jodi Dean, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. “Revolution or Ruin.” E-Flux. Journal #110 - June 2020. <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/110/335242/revolution-or-ruin/> //shree)

Climate Lenin

Lenin recognized the difference between confiscation and socialization, or, more in keeping with the terms here, between abolition and communism. The latter requires creative, collective cooperation, which has to be organized. Through the reorganization of the modes and relations of production and reproduction, the many come to exercise control over their lives and work. Neither revolution nor communism occurs in a single moment. For communists, revolution is the process of building communism. The negation of prior practices, assumptions, and institutions doesn’t happen overnight. Acknowledging the “long haul” is not to capitulate to capitalism or social democracy. It is how we refuse to capitulate to capitalism and democracy and accept the complexity of the task of building free societies and the revolutionary organizations adequate to that task.

One of the lessons Lenin took from the experience of the Paris Commune was the revolutionary role of the state. He applied this lesson to the setting in which the Bolsheviks found themselves:

This apparatus must not, and should not, be smashed. It must be wrested from the control of the capitalists; the capitalists and the wires they pull must be cut off, lopped off, chopped away from this apparatus; it must be subordinated to the proletarian Soviets; it must be expanded, made more comprehensive, and nation-wide. And this can be done by utilising the achievements already made by large-scale capitalism (in the same way as the proletarian revolution can, in general, reach its goal only by utilising these achievements).

The state is a ready-made apparatus for responding to the climate crisis. It can operate at the scales necessary to develop and implement plans for reorganizing agriculture, transportation, housing, and production. It has the capacity to transform the energy sector. It is backed by a standing army. What if all that power were channeled by the many against the few on behalf of a just response to the climate crisis?

During the Covid-19 pandemic, multiple voices have called on the state to take control of hospitals and industries, to build field units, supply necessary equipment, and provide economic relief. State response has been uneven, typically coupling enormous benefits to corporations with minimal benefits to working people. Even worse, repressive regimes such as those in Hungary and the US have seized the opportunity to enact anti-trans, anti-abortion, and anti-environmental measures. Again, our situation is one of revolution or ruin.

As Ted Nordhaus argues in a pro-capitalist takedown of the contemporary left, the progressive response to climate change has failed because of the incoherence between its diagnosis and its solution. The left sees that capitalism is responsible for climate change. It recognizes the urgency of the situation. But instead of building its capacity to seize the state, it advocates small-scale, local, decentralized solutions and more protests and democracy. If we really are on the verge of catastrophe, shouldn’t we building a revolutionary party able to respond to the disaster and push forward an egalitarian alternative?

The left has offered moralism when it needs to offer organization. Consider the contrast between the widely popular Fridays for the Future protests and the mass strikes in France and India. The former attempt moral persuasion. The latter assert proletarian power as they interrupt capital’s circulation and stand up against capital’s state. What if electrical workers all over the world followed the lead of their French comrades and turned off the lights? What if all transport workers refused to drive or fly all vehicles that weren’t zero-emission? What if the global working class emulated the 250 million Indians who brought their country to a halt with their January 8, 2020 general strike? Such mass working class action creates the space for further radicalization, further organization, further conviction that we have the capacity to bring about a radical transformation of the global economy. Organization, not moralism, gives us the power.

Nordhaus pinpoints the cause of the left’s incoherence: its rejection of centralized, top-down power. Climate Leninism, however, doesn’t fall for this tired spatial metaphor. When the state is seized by a revolutionary party, it is turned bottom-up. Grappling with the challenge of working this out in practice occupied Lenin until the end of his life. Getting local soviets or worker’s councils functioning is a challenge. In a complex federated system like the US, there are already elaborate local, county-wide, state, and national governmental offices. Lenin himself was particularly enamored of the post office and libraries, seeing both as models for socialist accounting and distribution. Our problem today is not excessive centralization. After forty years of neoliberalism, it is disorganization, unaccountability, ongoing exploitation, and widespread accumulation by dispossession. We need a politics adequate to this context, a militant, disciplined, communist politics that doesn’t flinch from the enormity of the challenge, nor the coordination at scale required to address it.

We know that this is a tall order. We know that the forces of fossil capital and social democracy stand in our way. But to do anything less than build towards an international revolution today would be ruinous. As dire as both the coronavirus and climate crises are—and we really have seen nothing yet—we need to exercise some dialectical ambivalence. Global capital sees these crises as an opportunity to entrench its power, to break into new markets, to extract more wealth. Social democracy sees the crises as a chance to strike an impossible social compromise between capital and workers. We need to see these crises as both social and ecological catastrophes of unprecedented proportions and as an opportunity to end exploitation, oppression, imperialism, and inequality. We need to see this moment from the perspective of the revolutionary party that we must build as climate Leninists.

## Case

### Presumption---1NC

#### Vote negative on presumption---their [performance of queer futurism] does nothing to change dominant discourses or structures that perpetuate [anti-queer violence]. Their challenge to [heteronormativity] has no means of spilling outside of debate, which is necessary for them to solve any of their impacts about [explain]---BUT their belief that it does is cruel optimism, which turns case.

### zIndividual Rounds --- 1NC

#### Individual rounds don’t change the community but creating community change through rounds in an activity that forces competition fractures coalitions and unity.

Atchison and Panetta 9. Jarrod, Director of Debate – Wake Forest University, Edward Panetta, Director of Debate – University of Georgia, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future”, 2009, Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, pg. 317-334

The final problem with an individual debate round focus is the role of competition. Creating community change through individual debate rounds sacrifices the “community” portion of the change. Many teams that promote activist strategies in debates profess that they are more interested in creating change than winning debates. What is clear, however, is that the vast majority of teams that are not promoting community change are very interested in winning debates. The tension that is generated from the clash of these opposing forces is tremendous. Unfortunately, this is rarely a productive tension. Forcing teams to consider their purpose in debating, their style in debates, and their approach to evidence are all critical aspects of being participants in the community. However, the dismissal of the proposed resolution that the debaters have spent countless hours preparing for, in the name of a community problem that the debaters often have little control over, does little to engender coalitions of the willing. Should a debate team lose because their director or coach has been ineffective at recruiting minority participants? Should a debate team lose because their coach or director holds political positions that are in opposition to the activist program? Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change. The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on **how to beat the strategy** with **little regard** for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community. If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur **outside** a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates **backlash** through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed. From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

### AT: Munoz

#### Munoz politics fails – no strategy and contradictions

Feminist/Queer/Troublemaking, 2010 (5/8, Book Review: CRUISING UTOPIA: The Then and There of Queer Futurity by Jose Esteban Munoz, <http://blog.lib.umn.edu/puot0002/8190/2010/05/book-review-cruising-utopia-the-then-and-there-of-queer-futurity-by-jose-esteban-munoz.html>)

As is true with his last book, Disidentifications, Munoz masters the art of combining high-theory with performance and media criticism. His ability to blend Marxist analysis and postmodern theory is an example of utopian promise in and of itself. Throughout each showcase of performance artist or artifact, Munoz is fairly consistent in convincing us that there is a space for futurity in queer-world-making. However, his ideas start to become redundant and what we get from each artifact starts to blend toward the middle and end of the book. We are shown over and over that alternate spaces of queer world-making are possible, that memory informs the present that informs the future, that potentiality is greater than possibility, but not much else. Furthermore, his attempt to claim the political potency of each of his examples (from drag to public sex to Andy Warhol to LeRoi Jones) falls flat at times, especially in contradictory moments when it seems he believes in the importance of collective organizing, but then concedes to individual acts of everyday resistance.

#### Munoz is locked into urban utopia creation – means his politics excludes most queers

St. Pierre 2010 (Scott St. Pierre, Montgomery College, (09/01/2010), "Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity by José Esteban Muñoz.", Journal of homosexuality (0091-8369), 57 (8), p. 1092. Accessed online via Wayne State Library, jj)

If there is any problem with the texts Muñoz selects it is that they almost exclusively share a metropolitan origin. Three sites function as spatial coordinates for the book: the suburbs of Miami of the author’s youth (briefly), Los Angeles, and New York City. If utopia might be a place, as Thomas More suggested long ago and as Muñoz speculates in his chapter on stages in clubs, is that space always an urban one? Muñoz protests that he does not mean to denigrate rural spaces, people, or places, but he mostly excludes them. Indeed, the figure of queerness that ends the book—the Brooklyn Bridge—could hardly be any more emblematic of the city and its (in some “liberal” circles) presumed superiority to the country. The absence of the rural here is made all the more obvious by the author’s defense that he does not mean to discount it, and one would like to see a fuller engagement with the worlds of other kinds of non-city-dwelling queers.

#### Present focus doesn’t lock us in but total abandonment of the present is politically counterproductive and turns their offense

St. Pierre, 10 (Scott St. Pierre, Montgomery College, (09/01/2010), "Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity by José Esteban Muñoz.", Journal of homosexuality (0091-8369), 57 (8), p. 1092. Accessed online via Wayne State Library, jj)

Instead, Muñoz embarks on a forward-looking project that relies heavily on the work of German Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch, a surprising choice because Bloch is known not to have held especially progressive views on sexuality or gender. Yet, for Cruising Utopia, Bloch forms an important way of thinking about the future, particularly in his “critical notion of utopia” (p. 22). This is likely to be the most controversial aspect of the book, in which Muñoz defends himself from charges that the idea of utopia is naïve, provides a somewhat evasive apologia for not using traditionally empirical evidence, and attacks the agenda of many “mainstream” lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) people and organizations. Especially problematic here is the contemptuous way he treats advocates of samesex marriage and military service inclusion. While it is nothing new to argue that a genuinely progressive queer agenda is not wholly embodied in the search for just those civil rights, Muñoz goes even further to reject those “pragmatic” ideas outright. Queer people should not get married, he argues, nor should they want to serve in the military, for that would represent a surrender to “gay pragmatic organizing [which] is in direct opposition to the idealist thought that I associate as endemic to forward-dawning queerness” (p. 21). But if queerness is always yet to come, what are we supposed to do in the meantime? Is forward-looking enough for the underemployed lesbian woman with breast cancer but no health benefits because she can’t share her partner’s as a legal spouse? Is it enough for the transgendered teenage girl growing up in an abusive household who can find no other way to escape but to take advantage of the opportunities (economic, geographic, educational) offered to members of the military? One good response to my objection is to say that there are more just ways of ensuring access to adequate and affordable health care for all – universal, single-payer public health care, for example. And we might also suggest that there ought to be other sorts of publically funded opportunities for young people to have access to educational and economic advancement that do not include weapons or support for an imperialist U.S. agenda. But in the absence of such policies—and if recent debates about health care in the United States suggest anything—it seems unlikely those things will happen soon. Muñoz’s commitment to the future problematically chastises those for whom marriage or the military might literally be matters of life and death and very cavalierly offers only the plea that we “look beyond the pragmatic sphere of the here and now, the hollow nature of the present” and “imagin[e] a futurity” (p. 21). Those with a vested interest in thinking about the practical politics of the here and now (school anti-bullying or employment non-discrimination, for example, to identify two additional “pragmatic” topics Muñoz does not name) might find this work unhelpful or even counterproductive.

### State Good

#### Legal action’s key to challenge heteronormativity

Campbell 12 (Peter, Prof of Communication @ Northwestern Univ., "The Procedural Queer: Substantive Due Process, Lawrence V Texas, and Queer Rhetorical Futures, Quarterly Journal of Speech, p. Academic Search Premier)

For those attempting to challenge heteronormativity in the United States and forward ‘‘queer’’ or ‘‘mainstream’’ ‘‘gay and lesbian’’ political agendas,2 the question of the best method and venue to effect change that is at once significant, durable, and resistant to appropriation by oppressive institutions and structures is of particular concern. Should those seeking to challenge heteronormativity locate the struggle for liberation in legislative, judicial, or anti-statist arenas, and what stakes are involved in such decisions?3 In the field of rhetoric in the United States, this question has been asked and answered by scholars working at the intersection of ‘‘critical legal rhetorical studies’’4 and ‘‘queer rhetorical studies.’’5 Queer scholarship in rhetoric6 and other fields7 has expressed deep skepticism with respect to the potential of ostensibly pro-gay and lesbian judicial decisions in the United States to aid or further queer political goals. Such skepticism is warranted. But given the significant and material effect that legislative and judicial rhetoric can have on queer lives in the United States,8 radical queer challenges to heteronormativity in US politics and culture must take place not only through the methods and venues of often anti-statist and extra-institutional ‘‘radical’’ queer activism,9 but also through those institutional locations most highly circumscribed by heteronormative politics, including the United States Supreme Court. Rhetorical analysis can contribute to radical queer politics by exploring how legislative and judicial pronouncements on sexuality in the United States can be framed and understood in ways that matter for radical queer futures, even as such pronouncements originate within, are circumscribed by, and reproduce the logic of heteronormative institutions.

#### Refusal of queer critique to engage the state promotes an inaccessible movement that is doomed to failure

Nikita Dhawan 15, Professor of Political Science (Political Theory and Gender Studies) and Director of the Research Platform Gender Studies: "Identities – Discourses – Transformations" at the University of Innsbruck, Austria, Homonationalism and State-phobia: The Postcolonial Predicament of Queering Modernities, Academia.edu

As Foucault himself warns state-phobia is deeply inscribed in liberal and neo-liberal ideas of civil society. The wickedness of the state is juxta- posed against the inherent goodness of civil society, so that the aim is the ‘whithering away of the state’. This anti-state-centric approach to political power, locates radical politics in extra-state space of innovation. This is why Puar and others reject pragmatic politics of same-sex marriage or anti-discrimination legislations. In contrast they support civil society campaigns like pink-watching that increasingly deploy the strategy of surveillance for shaming states into good behavior. Even as one critiques the harnessing of gender and sexuality by neo-liberal capitalism, the rejection of all feminist- queer politics oriented towards the state as part of a biopolitical agenda is disingenuous state-phobic rhetoric.

Postcolonial-queer-feminists are caught in an ambivalent, double-bind vis-à-vis the state: On the one hand, the state has historically been the source of violence and repression through the criminalization and pathologization of non-normative sexual practices. And yet, queer strategies seek to instru- mentalize the state to promote sexual justice. Even as the state is known to perpetuate heteronormative ideologies, which are founding myths of nations, the hope is that the state can function as a site of redress of gender and sexual inequality. Despite the problematic track-record with regard to sexual politics of all nation-states, whether European or non-European, it is dangerous to disregard the immense political implications of state-phobic positions, which are increasingly popular in radical discourses in the West.

As the recent re-criminalization of homosexuality in Uganda, India and Nigeria demonstrate, negotiations with state are indispensable and imperative for emancipatory queer politics in the global South. This is not a plea for statism; rather, one must be aware of the dangers of the replacement of state with non-state actors as motors of justice. Against this background, the recent anti-statist stance within postcolonial queer scholarship is alarming, as it ignores the importance of the state for those citizens who do not have access to transnational counterpublic spheres to address their grievances.

Decolonization, whether in USA, Israel or India, cannot be achieved merely through a strategy of shaming the state. Rather in the Gramscian- Spivakian sense, it is imperative to enable vulnerable disenfranchised indi- viduals and groups to access the state (Dhawan 􀀲􀀰􀀱􀀳). Accordingly, instead of a for or against position vis-à-vis the state, the more challenging question is how to reconﬁgure the state, given that its institutions and policies are the mobile eﬀect of a regime of multiple governmentalities. Thus the chal- lenge is how to pursue a non-statephobic queer politics that at the same time neither rationalizes the biopolitical state project nor makes the queer bodies governable. In postcolonial contexts, the state is like a pharmakon , namely, both poison and medicine. Postcolonial queer politics must explore strategies of converting poison into counterpoison (Spivak 􀀲􀀰􀀰􀀷: 􀀷􀀱).

Herein the ambivalent function of the state must be addressed. As Pharmakon, the inherent condradictions must be engaged with: Violence and justice, ideology and emancipation, law and discipline. If, following Foucault, the state has no stable essence, then it is marked by undecidability or doubleness. The sole focus on the negative aspects of the Pharmakon, namely the destructive and repressive traits, neutralizes and ignores the enabling and empowering aspects. Thus postcolonial-queer-feminist poli- tics must transform poison into remedy and formulate critique of the state beyond state-phobia. A challenging task, but anything else would be too risky!

#### Separating queer movements from macropolitical action leads to more struggle and more backlash from conservatives

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I have not tried to offer a more optimistic (or futurist) assessment of the gay struggle than Edelman, though he has construed my remarks in that way; his essay very pointedly conveyed a sense of the ongoing ordeal of gays in American society and a pessimism regarding inaction on the AIDS crisis, domestic partner rights, and anti-gay violence and the persistence of repressive restrictions on sexual freedom. I have also not challenged his criticism of the figure of the child as futurity, because I find it is very persuasive. So, too, **Edelman offers a compelling interpretation of homophobia in his delineation of how this discourse figures the child as future in order to make the queer the figure of the death and jouissance, of the negativity, that haunts all (normalizing) fantasies of the sexual relation and sexual identity.** What **I have challenged** is the claim **that this discourse defines**, or even dominates, **the political realm** as such**. It is the discourse of conservative Catholicism and Christian fundamentalism, and even though it resonates in strands of liberal discourse, it represents an intense reaction, backlash, against changes that have already taken place in American the gay and lesbian movement**. society, **many of them as the direct result of feminism and the gay and lesbian movement. It is indeed important not to underestimate the depth and danger of this reaction**, but it is a reactionary, not a foundational, discourse. **The uncoupling of sexuality and reproduction is ubiquitous in American culture today as a result of multiple developments beyond the expansion of gay rights** and the right to abortion, including birth control, divorce, and changing patterns of family life, as well as consumerism and mass culture; it may well be that the sheer scope, and irreversibility, **all of these developments also intensifies the targeting of gays by conservative ideology and Christian fundamentalist movements. But that is all the more reason to recognize that the deconstruction of the phobic figuration of the queer is a struggle to be pursued inside as well as outside politics.**

### Ballots as Validating --- 1NC

#### Ballots as validating are bad.

Karlberg 3 (Michael, Assistant Professor of Communication at Western Washington University, PEACE & CHANGE, v28, n3, July, p. 339-41)

Granted, social activists do "win" occasional “battles” in these adversarial arenas, but the root causes of their concerns largely remain unaddressed and the larger "wars" arguably are not going well. Consider the case of environmental activism. Countless environmental protests, lobbies, and lawsuits mounted in recent generations throughout the Western world. Many small victories have been won. Yet environmental degradation continues to accelerate at a rate that far outpaces the highly circumscribed advances made in these limited battles the most committed environmentalists acknowledge things are not going well. In addition, adversarial strategies of social change embody assumptions that have internal consequences for social movements, such as internal factionalization. For instance, virtually all of the social projects of the "left” throughout the 20th century have suffered from recurrent internal factionalization. The opening decades of the century were marked by political infighting among vanguard communist revolutionaries. The middle decades of the century were marked by theoretical disputes among leftist intellectuals. The century's closing decades have been marked by the fracturing of the a new left\*\* under the centrifugal pressures of identity politics. Underlying this pattern of infighting and factionalization is the tendency to interpret differences—of class, race, gender, perspective, or strategy—as sources of antagonism and conflict. In this regard, the political "left" and "right" both define themselves in terms at a common adversary—the "other"—defined by political differences. Not surprisingly, advocates of both the left and right frequently invoke the need for internal unity in order to prevail over their adversaries on the other side of the alleged political spectrum. However, because the terms left and right axe both artificial and reified categories that do not reflect the complexity of actual social relations, values, or beliefs, there is no way to achieve lasting unity within either camp because there are no actual boundaries between them. In reality, social relations, values, and beliefs are infinitely complex and variable. Yet once an adversarial posture is adopted by assuming that differences are sources at conflict, initial distinctions between the left and the right inevitably are followed by subsequent distinctions within the left and the right. Once this centrifugal process is set in motion, it is difficult, if not impossible, to restrain. For all of these reasons, adversarial strategies have reached a point of diminishing returns even if such strategies were necessary and viable in the past when human populations were less socially and ecologically interdependent those conditions no longer exist. Our reproductive and technological success as a species has led to conditions of unprecedented interdependence, and no group on the planet is isolated any longer. Under these new conditions, new strategies not only are possible but are essential. Humanity has become a single interdependent social body. In order to meet the complex social and environmental challenges now facng us, we must learn to coordinate our collective actions. Yet a body cannot coordinate its actions as long as its "left" and is "right," or its "north" and its "south," or its "east" and its "west" are locked in adversarial relationships.

### Competition Turn --- 1NC

Their method of debate links to a competition turn that magnifies our offense. The nature of debate requires the neg to disagree which creates a moral hazard where we’re forced to negate the value of the 1AC or weaponize strategies against the students---intensifies psychic burnout.

### AT: Debate about Debate/Anti-Trust DA

#### The disappearance of antitrust law from public discourse has cemented corporate power. A paradigm shift is possible, but requires making monopolies a political issue again, and advocating legal change.

David Dayen 15, author of *Monopolized: Life in the Age of Corporate Power (2020)* and *Chain of Title: How Three Ordinary Americans Uncovered Wall Street's Great Foreclosure Fraud*, “Bring Back Antitrust,” The American Prospect, Vol. 26, No. 4, Fall 2015, lexis.

In 1964, historian Richard Hofstadter gave a speech at the University of California, Berkeley, titled "What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?" He wondered why anti-monopoly sentiment ceased to become the subject of public agitation. "Once the United States had an antitrust movement without antitrust prosecutions," Hofstadter said. "In our time, there have been antitrust prosecutions without an antitrust movement."

Now we have lost both the movement and the prosecutions. When we talk about banks that are too big to fail, we're talking about antitrust. When we talk about the high cost of health care, we're talking about antitrust. So many of our key domestic issues are fundamentally questions about whether we should tolerate monopolies, or dismantle them. But this formulation-a centerpiece of public debate in the last robberbaron era between the 1880s and 1910s-has all but disappeared from popular discourse.

Can anti-monopoly sentiment be revived? When New York's Working Families Party first recruited Zephyr Teachout to run for governor, she said she would only do it if she could talk about monopolies. "They polled it, and they were correct that nobody knew what I was talking about," Teachout says. But when she eventually ran an insurgent campaign against incumbent Andrew Cuomo, she was determined to talk about it anyway.

"The minute you got past the sound-bite level, people responded to the concentration of power," Teachout says. They did campaign events at places where people paid their cable bills, using the pending Comcast-Time Warner merger, eventually abandoned, as the hook. She engaged farmers in upstate New York about monopsony power, and discussed Amazon and big banks on the stump. And it resonated. After only one month of campaigning, Teachout won 35 percent of the vote, with particular strength in upstate counties where farming issues were prominent.

"The Tea Party talks to people and says, 'You're out of power because government is taking it away from you,"' Teachout says. "Far too often, Democrats say, 'You're wrong, you're not out of power.' That's dissonant with our lived experience. You're out of power ... because your priorities don't matter and JPMorgan's do."

Beyond Teachout, you can see through the haze the stirrings of a grassroots antitrust agenda. The greatest anti-monopoly victory of the modern age, the Federal Communications Commission's net-neutrality rules, owed much to a smart, tech-savvy movement that leveraged big protest platforms. Web-native activists fought for the decentralized power of the Internet, without gatekeepers collecting tolls along the way. And they made the connection to things like the Comcast-Time Warner merger, which failed amid public outcry.

"After this existential threat to the Web, you see the same groups becoming interested in the deep history of anti-monopoly laws," Teachout says. "It's kind of an exciting intellectual moment, a fusion between old-school farmers who have been complaining for 30 years and new net-neutrality dreamers."

Monopolists have long used technological advances to consolidate power, from Gilded Age tycoons leveraging control of railroads and telegraphs to Amazon using its first-mover status in e-commerce to squeeze book producers, or Google harvesting traffic to their market-leading search engine to serve ads. It's easy to translate the need for a neutral platform for websites into the same need for book sales or car ride-sharing.

The European Union, in fact, did file formal antitrust charges against Google, accusing it of forcing search engine users into its own shopping platforms, and bundling Android phones with their own apps, to prevent competitors from performing the same functions. The FTC shut down its own investigation into Google over the same concerns in 2013. But an inadvertent disclosure revealed that the agency's Bureau of Competition recommended bringing a lawsuit, arguing that Google's conduct "has resulted-and will result-in real harm to consumers and to innovation in the online search and advertising markets." The political leadership ignored the recommendation.

The next administration must show "leadership that has a certain intellectual curiosity," says Maurice Stucke, pointing to the Google case as a missed opportunity. An alteration in posture would make enforcement far more vigorous, and bringing more cases will give litigators more experience and confidence to negotiate the judicial barriers. The American Antitrust Institute plans to create a transition document for the incoming administration, as they did for the Obama transition.

But at a time of political disempowerment, teaching about the dangers of monopolies and how we have the laws on the books to fight them, and creating upward pressure to do it, offers great potential for a paradigm shift. Connecting Senator Elizabeth Warren's fight against a rigged financial system and Al Franken's fight against media concentration can spark broader political energy.

You could see this potential in Washington, D.C., where in August, the city's Public Service Commission rejected a merger between energy firms Exelon and Pepco, citing "more active participation by parties and interested persons than any other proceeding in the Commission's more than a century of operations." Activists argued a giant Exelon conglomerate would fail to devote resources to the city's clean-energy goals, connecting anti-monopolization with fighting climate change.

There are a lot of reasons for runaway monopolies: an intellectual hijacking by Chicago-school conservative economists, the over-financialization of the economy, a failure of federal antitrust enforcement. But perhaps the biggest reason is that antitrust policy has become divorced from politics, confined to specialized lawyers and mathematicians instead of citizens and activists. Without grassroots momentum, politicians and enforcement agencies can safely ignore the issue. That's the challenge for a small band of academics, think-tank fellows, and activists: to make monopolies a vital issue again, connecting with the severe economic anxiety Americans feel.

#### Debating about policy nuances of addressing war, economic instability, and climate change is important.

Nick Srnicek & Alex Williams 15. \*\*Lecturer at City University London; PhD from the London School of Economics. \*\*Lecturer at City University London. *Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work*. Verso Books. 34-40.

OVERWHELMED

Why did folk politics arise in the first place? Why is it that folk political tendencies, for all their manifest flaws, are so seductive and appealing to the movements of today? At least three answers present themselves. The first explanation is to see folk politics as a response to the problem of how to interpret and act within an ever more complex world. The second, related explanation involves situating folk politics as a reaction to the historical experiences of the communist and social democratic left. Finally, folk politics is a more immediate response to the empty spectacle of contemporary party politics.

Increasingly, multipolar global politics, economic instability, and anthropogenic climate change outpace the narratives we use to structure and make sense of our lives. Each of these is an example of what is termed a complex system, which features nonlinear dynamics, where marginally different inputs can cause dramatically divergent outputs, intricate sets of causes feedback on one another in unexpected ways, and which characteristically operates on scales of space and time that go far beyond any individual’s unaided perception.23 Globalisation, international politics, and climate change: each of these systems shapes our world, but their effects are so extensive and complicated that it is difficult to place our own experience within them. The global economy is a good example of this. In simple terms, the economy is not an object amenable to direct perception; it is distributed across time and space (you will never meet ‘the economy’ in person); it incorporates a wide array of elements, from property laws to biological needs, natural resources to technological infrastructures, market stalls and supercomputers; and it involves an enormous and intricately interacting set of feedback loops, all of which produce emergent effects that are irreducible to its individual components.24 In other words, the interaction of an economy’s parts produces effects that cannot be understood just by knowing how those parts work in isolation – it is only in grasping the relations between them that the economy can be made sense of. While we might have an idea of what an economy consists of, we will never be able to experience it directly in the same way as other phenomena. It can only be observed symptomatically through key statistical indexes (charting changes in inflation or interest rates, stock indexes, GDP, and so on), but can never be seen, heard or touched in its totality.

As a result, despite everything that has been written about capitalism, we still struggle to understand its dynamics and its mechanisms. Most importantly, we lack a ‘cognitive map’ of our socioeconomic system: a mental picture of how individual and collective human action can be situated within the unimaginable vastness of the global economy.25 Recent decades have seen an increasing complexity in the dynamics that impinge upon politics. We might consider the imminent threat of anthropogenic climate change as a new kind of problem – one that is unamenable to any simple solution and that involves such intricately woven effects that it is hard to even know where to intervene. Equally, the global economy today appears significantly more complex in terms of the mobility of capital, the intricacies of global finance and the multiplicity of actors involved. How well do our traditional political images of the world map onto these changes? For the left at least, an analysis premised on the industrial working class was a powerful way to interpret the totality of social and economic relations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, thereby articulating clear strategic objectives. Yet the history of the global left over the course of the twentieth century attests to the ways in which this analysis failed to attend to both the range of possible liberating struggles (based in gender, race or sexuality) and the ability of capitalism to restructure itself – through the creation of the welfare state, or the neoliberal transformations of the global economy. Today, the old models often falter in the face of new problems; we lose the capacity to understand our position in history and in the world at large.

This separation between everyday experience and the system we live within results in increased alienation: we feel adrift in a world we do not understand. The cultural theorist Fredric Jameson notes that the proliferation of conspiracy theories is partly a response to this situation.26 Conspiracy theories act by narrowing the agency behind our world to a single figure of power (the Bilderberg Group, the Freemasons or some other convenient scapegoat). Despite the extraordinary complexity of some of these theories, they nevertheless provide a reassuringly simple answer to ‘who is behind it all’, and what our own role is in the situation. In other words, they act precisely as a (faulty) cognitive map.

Folk politics presents itself as another possible response to the problems of overwhelming complexity. If we do not understand how the world operates, the folk-political injunction is to reduce complexity down to a human scale. Indeed, folk-political writing is saturated with calls for a return to authenticity, to immediacy, to a world that is ‘transparent’, ‘human-scaled’, ‘tangible’, ‘slow’, ‘harmonious’, ‘simple’, and ‘everyday’.27 Such thinking rejects the complexity of the contemporary world, and thereby rejects the possibility of a truly postcapitalist world. It attempts to give a human face to power; whereas what is truly terrifying is the generally asubjective nature of the system. The faces are interchangeable; the power remains the same. The turn towards localism, temporary moments of resistance, and the intuitive practices of direct action all effectively attempt to condense the problems of global capitalism into concrete figures and moments.

In this process, folk politics often reduces politics to an ethical and individual struggle. There is a tendency sometimes to imagine that we simply need ‘good’ capitalists, or a ‘responsible’ capitalism. At the same time, the imperative to ‘make it local’ leads folk politics to fetishise immediate results and the concrete appearance of action. Delaying a corporate attack on the environment, for instance, is lauded as a success – even if the company simply waits out public attention before returning once again. Moreover, as Rosa Luxemburg pointed out long ago, the fetishisation of ‘immediate results’ leads to an empty pragmatism that struggles to maintain the present balance of power, rather than seeking to change structural conditions.28 Without the necessary abstraction of strategic thought, tactics are ultimately fleeting gestures. Finally, the abjuring of complexity dovetails with the neoliberal case for markets. One of the primary arguments made against planning has been that the economy is simply too complex to be guided.29 The only alternative is therefore to leave the distribution of resources to the market and reject any attempt to guide it rationally.30 Considered in all these ways, folk politics appears as an attempt to make global capitalism small enough to be thinkable – and at the same time, to articulate how to act upon this restricted image of capitalism. By contrast, the argument of this book is that folk-political tendencies are mistaken. If complexity presently outstrips humanity’s capacities to think and control, there are two options: one is to reduce complexity down to a human scale; the other is to expand humanity’s capacities. We endorse the latter position. Any postcapitalist project will necessarily require the creation of new cognitive maps, political narratives, technological interfaces, economic models, and mechanisms of collective control to be able to marshal complex phenomena for the betterment of humanity.

#### Debate’s focus shouldn’t solely be the production of ethical subjectivities. Rather, taking stances on global issues is necessary to develop accountability to global violence.

David Chandler, 2009. Professor of international relations, University of Westminster. “Questioning Global Political Activism,” in *What is Radical Politics Today?* ed. Jonathan Pugh. 81-4.

Today more and more people are ‘doing politics’ in their academic work. This is the reason for the boom in International Relations (IR) study and the attraction of other social sciences to the global sphere. I would argue that the attraction of IR for many people has not been IR theory but the desire to practise global ethics. The boom in the IR discipline has coincided with a rejection of Realist theoretical frameworks of power and interests and the sovereignty/anarchy problematic. However, I would argue that this rejection has not been a product of theoretical engagement with Realism but an ethical act of rejection of Realism's ontological focus.

It seems that our ideas and our theories say much more about us than the world we live in. Normative theorists and Constructivists tend to support the global ethical turn arguing that we should not be as concerned with 'what is' as with the potential for the emergence of a global ethical community. Constructivists, in particular, focus upon the ethical language which political elites espouse rather than the practices of power. But the most dangerous trends in the discipline today are those frameworks which have taken up Critical Theory and argue that focusing on the world as it exists is conservative problem-solving while the task for critical theorists is to focus on emancipatory alternative forms of living or of thinking about the world. Critical thought then becomes a process of wishful thinking rather than one of engagement, with its advocates arguing that we need to focus on clarifying our own [END PAGE 81] ethical frameworks and biases and positionality, before thinking about or teaching on world affairs. This becomes 'me-search' rather than research. We have moved a long way from Hedley Bull's (1995) perspective that, for academic research to be truly radical, we had to put our values to the side to follow where the question or inquiry might lead.

The inward-looking and narcissistic trends in academia, where we are more concerned with our reflectivity- the awareness of our own ethics and values - than with engaging with the world, was brought home to me when I asked my IR students which theoretical frameworks they agreed with most. They mostly replied Critical Theory and Constructivism. This is despite the fact that the students thought that states operated on the basis of power and self-interest in a world of anarchy. Their theoretical preferences were based more on what their choices said about them as ethical individuals, than about how theory might be used to understand and engage with the world.

Conclusion

I have attempted to argue that there is a lot at stake in the radical understanding of engagement in global politics. Politics has become a religious activity, an activity which is no longer socially mediated; it is less and less an activity based on social engagement and the testing of ideas in public debate or in the academy. Doing politics today, whether in radical activism, government policy-making or in academia, seems to bring people into a one-to-one relationship with global issues in the same way religious people have a one-to-one relationship with their God.

Politics is increasingly like religion because when we look for meaning we find it inside ourselves rather than in the external consequences of our 'political' acts. What matters is the conviction or the act in itself: its connection to the global sphere is one that we increasingly tend to provide idealistically. Another way of expressing this limited sense of our subjectivity is in the popularity of globalisation theory - the idea that instrumentality is no longer possible today because the world is such a complex and interconnected place and therefore there is no way of knowing the consequences of our actions. The more we engage in the new politics where there is an unmediated relationship between us as individuals and global issues, the less we engage instrumentally with the outside world, and the less we engage with our peers and colleagues at the level of political or intellectual debate and organisation. [END PAGE 82]

You may be thinking that I have gone some way to describing or identifying what the problems might be but I have not mentioned anything about a solution. I won't dodge the issue. One thing that is clear is that the solution is not purely an intellectual or academic one; the demand for global ethics is generated by our social reality and social experiences. Marx spent some time considering a similar crisis of political subjectivity in 1840s Germany and in his writings - The German Ideology, Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Theses on Feuerbach, and elsewhere - he raged against the idealism of contemporary thought and argued that the criticism of religion needed to be replaced by the criticism of politics - by political activism and social change based on the emerging proletariat (see Marx, 1975, for example). Nearly two centuries later it is more difficult to see an emerging political subject which can fulfil the task of 'changing the world' rather than merely 'reinterpreting it' through philosophy.

I have two suggestions. Firstly, that there is a pressing need for an intellectual struggle against the idealism of global ethics. The point needs to be emphasised that our freedom to engage in politics, to choose our identities and political campaigns, as well as governments' freedom to choose their ethical campaigns and wars of choice, reflects a lack of socialties and social engagement. There is no global political struggle between 'Empire' and its 'Radical Discontents'; the Foucauldian temptation to see power and resistance everywhere is a product of wishful or lazy thinking dominated by the social categories of the past. The stakes are not in the global stratosphere but much closer to home. Politics appears to have gone global because there is a breakdown of genuine community and the construction of fantasy communities and fantasy connections in global space. Unless we bring politics back down to earth from heaven, our critical, social and intellectual lives will continue to be diminished ones.

Secondly, on the basis that the political freedom of our social atomisation leads us into increasingly idealised approaches to the world we live in, we should take more seriously Hedley Bull's (1995) injunction to pursue the question, or in Alain Badiou's (2004: 237-8) words subordinate ourselves to the 'discipline of the real'. Subordination to the world outside us is a powerful factor that can bind those interested in critical research, whereas the turn away from the world and the focus on our personal values can ultimately only be divisive. To facilitate external engagement and external judgement, I suggest we experiment with ways to build up social bonds with our peers that can limit our freedoms and develop our sense of responsibility and accountability to others. We may have to construct these social connections artificially but their [END PAGE 83] value and instrumentality will have to be proven through our ability to engage with, understand, critique and ultimately overcome the practices and subjectivities of our time.

#### Scenario analysis unlocks an intellectual openness to overcome cognitive biases and incorporate complementary theories while making research policy-relevant

Sus 20—Postdoctoral Fellow at the Hertie School of Governance and works in the Dahrendorf Forum, which is a joint initiative by the Hertie School, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and Stiftung Mercator [Monika Sus and Marcel Hadeed (Dahrendorf Research Associate at the Hertie School of Governance), February 2020, “Theory-infused and policy-relevant: On the usefulness of scenario analysis for international relations”, Contemporary Security Policy, Accessed through the Wake Forest Library] AMarb

Added-value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship

As Tomé and Açıkalın (2019) point out, in order to fill the gap between IR theory and real-world problems, “an increasing number of scholars have come to embrace a spirit of intellectual openness, recognizing both the need for greater flexibility in the theoretical formulations and the possibility of complementarity by other theories and approaches” (p. 12). This section discusses the added value of scenario analysis as a complementary approach to traditional IR methods. The most obvious advantage of scenario analysis as a methodology, grounded in the reservoir of foresight studies, lies by definition in its ability to tackle future events. As mentioned before, there are no specified instruments within traditional IR methods which would allow scholars to go beyond past and present. The only exception is forecasting, one of the formal methods in IR, which is, however, distinctly different from foresight.

The underlying logic of forecasting is to provide predictions about the future by drawing on mathematical models and big data-sets based on known patterns. Thus, it is not particularly suitable to accommodate discontinuities. Foresight, as described above, aims at going beyond existing patterns by developing alternative futures based on an innovative combination of multiple driving forces. Its goal is to capture a set of possible futures and learn from them by examining the causal relations between driving forces and their different evolutions. By applying scenario approaches, scholars can thus account for evolving dynamics and discuss such timely issues as the consequences of Brexit for both British and EU-security, economics and politics (Brakman, Garretsen, & Kohl, 2018; Martill & Sus, 2018; Musolff, 2017; Verschueren, 2017; Ziv et al., 2018). Yet, scenario analysis offers more than the possibility to talk about the future. We see a fourfold merit of adding scenario analysis to the range of methods applied by IR scholars.

Confronting enduring assumptions

As we presented in the previous section, the main feature of explorative scenarios, which are the subject of this paper, is to stimulate creative thinking by challenging the deeply held assumptions of their authors. In other words, this method is helpful for overcoming enduring cognitive biases—mental errors such as linearity, presentism, and group think caused by the subconscious and simplified information processing of humans (Heuer, 1999, pp. 111– 112). Humans have the tendencies to focus on the present at the expense of the future and to think about the future in linear terms by extrapolating past trends into the future. As Gaddis (1992) points out, “we tend to bias our historical and our theoretical analyses too much toward continuity (…) we rarely find a way to introduce discontinuities into theory, or to attempt to determine what causes them to happen” (p. 52). Even if Gaddis does not explicitly mention scenarios, he refers to the concepts underlying scenario approaches (Han, 2011, p. 51). Scenario analysis attends to “deeper, otherwise left implicit, assumptions about continuous and linear patterns of development” (Wilkinson et al., 2013, p. 707). The process of scenario development invites the participants to reveal and question convictions which have so far remained unchallenged, and to question the linearity of world developments.

The ability of reexamining one’s own assumptions and going beyond linear patterns of development is essential for IR scholarship. To illustrate it with two examples: IR scholars and historians did not think that the Soviet Union could collapse and were startled by its fall, the peaceful resolution of the Cold War and the transformation of the bipolar system (Davis, 2005; Gaddis, 1992). In a similar vein, United States scholars were for decades so convinced of China’s economic, political, and cultural limitations that they neglected the possibility of its sudden ascent and were taken by surprise when it happened (Hundley, Kenzer, & Peterson, 2015). Interestingly, since the rise of China became evident, the United States debate on its future has been marked by a similar linearity of thought, leading to single-outcome predictions of China’s long-term future (Kerbel, 2004). In both cases, the discipline proved incapable of anticipating events of such importance, because scholars took for granted the status quo instead of confronting their bias towards linearity and detect manifestations of upcoming change. As a result, two major geopolitical surprises—the end of the Cold War and the rise of China have at first been neglected, forcing academia to catch up.

Against this backdrop, foresight helps IR scholars to exit the tunnel vision on world affairs and discover potentially valuable nonlinear lines of development. These can be both innovative in terms of scholarship, and policy-relevant by offering a reflection on unexpected discontinuities. Thus, it can facilitate the intellectual capability to think the unthinkable (Porter, 2016, p. 259).

Bringing forward new research questions

Scenario analysis starts with confronting one’s enduring assumptions and developing multiple causal possibilities, through which scholars can potentially discover topics that have not been examined before. One of the greatest challenges for any scholar is to identify innovative venues for research that might bring the discipline forward and advance publicity for one’s work. In Lakatosian terms, such an ability is often considered an evidence of a progressive research program.10 Since the prime feature of scenario analysis is to detect rapid and significant shifts in trajectories, or the forces behind them, this method succors when defining new pressing topics for academia. In particular, as mentioned in the previous section, scenario analysis enables the detection of both weak signals and wild cards. By drawing attention to these hitherto overlooked but potentially pressing issues, scenario analysis can identify research agendas for further investigation (Barma et al., 2016). Therefore, scenario analysis seems to be the right tool to advance innovative research since it helps scholars drive their research into new areas, away from moribund topics that have been followed for many decades. By “identifying questions of likely future significance” (Barma et al., 2016, p. 6), scenario analysis can contribute to combatting the proliferation of researchers in fields occupying the political status quo, such as Soviet or Japan studies in the United States in the 1980s. At the same time, innovative research topics confront the uncertainties that are crucial for policymakers to be monitored closely.

Dealing with the complexity and interdisciplinarity of real-world issues

Another added value of the scenario analysis for IR scholarship lies in its ability to provide comprehensive causal reasoning and thus to tackle complex issues. As mentioned in the introduction, the world’s complexity combined with abrupt shifts poses a challenge for IR scholarship. The possibility to accommodate multiple driving forces, to take into account different values they might take and finally to combine them with each other and see how they affect the dependent variable, makes the scenario approach quite unique. Traditional IR methods work with a limited number of independent variables, formulate and test hypotheses usually based on the relation between a single causal variable and the dependent variable. Investigating complex causal trajectories is therefore not possible. Against this background, we agree with Barma et al. (2016) and his colleagues who argue that scenarios are highly apt for dealing with complexity and uncertainty and providing academia with a tool for “actionable clarity in understanding contemporary global issues” (p. 1).

Moreover, the scenario approach helps to tackle the challenges of interdisciplinarity that is tied to complexity. By drawing on the active participation of people from different disciplines, backgrounds, and with different expertise in the scenario development process, it brings interdisciplinarity to the table by default. The key advantage of the approach is that this interdisciplinary conversation takes place prior to and during the research phase, rather than after it. This distinguishes the scenario approach from other methods that bring interdisciplinary perspectives together but do not facilitate a discussion between them, rather letting them passively co-exist. By exploring the dynamics between seemingly unrelated vectors of change (key drivers), scenario analysis can be useful for shedding light on developments that would have been overlooked by narrower research designs. In security studies, for example, scenario analysis can connect the dots between hard, soft, traditional and non-traditional understandings of security and capture the interplay of economic-societalenvironmental and technological changes. Imposing interdisciplinarity also helps to counter the “hyper-fragmentation of knowledge” that “makes it difficult for even scholars in different disciplines to understand each other, much less policy-makers and general public” (Desch, 2015, p. 381).

Complex real-world issues that were tackled using scenario analysis include the Israel-Palestine conflict (Stein et al., 1998), Turkey’s geopolitical environment (Çelik & Blum, 2007), the prospects of the United States– China conflict (Friedberg, 2005) and the consequences of Brexit for EU foreign and security policy (Martill & Sus, 2018). An examination of these topics without the application of interdisciplinary approaches would not be possible precisely due to their multifaceted character.

Stepping out of the ivory tower

Finally, scenario analysis also enables IR scholars to establish a channel of communication with policy-makers other than conducting interviews for their own research or providing ad-hoc consultations. A participatory scenario process forges “deep and shared understanding between its participants” (Ramírez & Wilkinson, 2016, p. 21). In scenario workshops, academics and policy-makers work together, confront their world visions and assumptions and arrive at an agreement upon which they develop narratives for alternative futures. Hence, scenario analysis can be perceived as a tool towards more exchange between academia and policy-making that can contribute to a better understanding between the two worlds. For policymakers, it provides the opportunity to consider long-term trends (an occasion not often found in the day-to-day nature of politics). For academics, it provides insight into which trends are most concerning for policy-makers, allowing them to check and ultimately enhance the relevance of their research agendas.

We acknowledge the difficulty to engage policy-makers in foresight exercises caused by their time-constrains and possible lack of interest. Yet, in our experience, this problem mostly refers to high-level policy-makers. Mid-level and former officials and policy-makers have more time and willingness to participate in foresight exercises and contribute equally valuable perspectives. The participatory character of foresight exercises facilitates the exchange of views from different stakeholders on an equal level. In our case, as the evaluation has shown, it has proven to be stimulating for each of the engaged groups.

Moreover, the policy dialogue benefits from scenarios’ accessibility to a broader audience. Scenario publications tend to be shorter and easier to read than the average academic publication and as Nye (2008) rightly notes “a premium on time is a major difference between the two cultures” of academia and policy-making. Since scenario publications are more suitable to the time- and attention-constraints of many policy-makers, they improve the accessibility of research findings for the policy world (Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017). An illustrative example is offered by a foresight exercise conducted by the Aspen Institute Berlin in 2017. A group of academics, think tank experts and policy-makers developed scenarios on the future of the liberal world order that served as raw material for a newspaper from the future titled “The Aspen Insight” and dated October 21, 2025. Not only did the presentation of the newspaper catch the attention of many Berlin-based policy-makers but the “The Aspen Insight” was also attached as a supplement to the Berlin daily Tagesspiegel, and reached more than 300,000 readers.11

We acknowledge that the four aspects of the added value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship are interrelated and that their boundaries are not clear-cut. Yet, we believe, they highlight distinct benefits of this approach for academics that want to tackle the challenges of today’s world via their research.

#### Status quo movements must engage one another – viewing problems as separate denies the necessity of solidarity. Claims that the aff’s struggle is most important ignore political realities that require coalitions.

Keeanga-Yamahtta TAYLOR 17, assistant professor in Princeton University's Center for African American Studies [“No Time for Despair,” *Jacobin*, January 28 17, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/01/trump-black-lives-racism-sexism-anti-inauguration/]

There is deep anger and disgust with the political status quo in the United States. The Occupy movement, Black Lives Matter, the heroic pipeline struggles in North Dakota, and the thirteen million people who voted for Bernie Sanders have unearthed that to the world.

When systemic problems become too large to ignore, when socialists start gaining millions of votes, for example, or when black people riot and rebel in the streets, the news media is forced to provide some explanation. And in doing so, they typically give us fractured glimpses of reality. But rarely do they piece together the entire picture. Consider four separate news stories from last year.

The first is the continuing crisis of the opioid addiction crisis in this country. There are two million people addicted to opioids in the United States, a disproportionate number of whom are white. From 2009 to 2014, almost half a million people have died from opioid overdoses, a fourfold increase since 1999.

A second story, briefly in the news, reported on the decline in life expectancy for white women. It is unprecedented for life expectancy to reverse in a so-called first-world country. In the United States peer countries, life expectancy is actually growing. Why is life expectancy for working-class white women in decline? Drug overdose, suicide, and alcohol abuse.

In Chicago, the story has been the rise in shootings and murders in the city’s working-class black neighborhoods. In 2016, there were 4,379 people shot in Chicago, and 797 people killed. The overwhelmingly majority of both were African-American.

The news media’s nonsensical explanations for the violence include retaliation. But that is only matched by the nonsense offered by elected officials, which includes the absence of role models and poor parenting. What is almost never offered as at least part of the answer is how Chicago has the highest black unemployment rate of the nation’s five largest cities at 25 percent, that nearly half of black men aged 20 to 24 are neither in school nor employed, that Chicago has the third-highest poverty rate of large cities in the US, and that it is the most segregated city in the country.

Finally, there is the story of the shrinking of the so-called middle class. In the 1970s, 61 percent of Americans fell into that vague but stable category. Today, that number has fallen to 50 percent. It is driven by the growing wealth inequality that exists in this country.

In the last year alone, the one percent saw their income rise by seven percent, and the .1 percent saw their income rise by 9 percent. In general, the richest 20 percent of US households own 84 percent of the wealth in this country, while the bottom 40 percent own less than one percent.

The media would have us believe that this is a story primarily about the Rust Belt and disgruntled white workers. In fact, it is also a story about 240,000 black homeowners, who lost their houses to foreclosures in the last eight years. It is also a story about urban school closures and the decimation of employment for black educators. Thousands of black teachers have been fired in the last decade.

These four prominent stories reported on over the last several years are often told separately, reinforcing the perception that different groups of ordinary people in this country live in their own world and have experiences that are wholly separate from each other. But what would happen if we put these stories together, and told them as a single narrative about life in this country?

If we told them together, it could allow us to see that the anxieties, stresses, confusions, and frustrations about life world today are not owned by one group, but are shared by many. It would not tell us that everyone suffers the same oppression, but it would allow us to see that even if we don’t experience a particular kind of oppression, every working person in this country is going through something. Everyone is trying to figure out how to survive, and many are failing.

If we put these stories together, we would gain more insight into how ordinary white people have as much stake in the fight for a different kind of society as anyone else.

We wouldn’t so casually dismiss their suffering as privilege, because they do not suffer as much as black and brown people in this country. In fact, we might find that the privileges of white skin run very thin in a country where nineteen million white people languish in poverty.

Apparently, the wages of whiteness are not so great that they can stop millions of ordinary white people from literally drinking and drugging themselves to death, to escape the despair of living in this “greatest country on earth.”

If we put these separate stories into a single story, we could make better sense of why socialism is rising in popularity, why people have taken to the streets over the last six years to protest the growing and racial and economic inequality. There are 400 billionaires in this country. They are the reason why there are forty-seven million poor people. You cannot have untold, obscene wealth unless you have untold, obscene poverty. That is the law of the free market.

And how does this parasitic one percent of the population hold onto their wealth when we are so many? Racism, immigrant bashing, homophobia, transphobia, sexism, nationalism – they get us to fight each other while they hoard their wealth, and they keep our stories separate from each other, so that we never understand the entire story, only our particular part of it.

But knowledge alone of the existence of racism, inequality, poverty, and injustice does not equip with our side with the political tools needed to fight the battles of today or fight for a socialist future. We need struggle, but we also need politics, because we must contend with a political establishment that wants to lower our expectations, to believe that this existing society is the best that we can expect from humanity.

Hillary Clinton ran a campaign of low expectations, a campaign that cynically pivoted around the notion that ordinary people shouldn’t ask for too much. For all the excitement that Bernie Sanders’ campaign generated for rightly demanding more, his commitment to remaining in the Democratic Party then threatens to neuter his political revolution. Expecting the Democratic Party to fight for the democratic redistribution of wealth and resources in this country is like expecting to squeeze orange juice out of an apple. It is impossible.

We must build independent organizations and political parties that are not connected to the Democratic Party, or that rise and fall with each electoral cycle. We have to build organizations that are democratic, multiracial, and militant, with a foundation in solidarity.

“Solidarity” meaning that even if you don’t experience a particular oppression, it doesn’t matter, because you understand that as ordinary people, our fates are tied together, and that one group’s liberation is dependent upon the liberation of all the oppressed and exploited.

Another world is possible. Another United States is possible, but only if we organize and fight for it. In closing, I want to quote from a note that was taped to the front door of my son Ellison’s daycare center on Inauguration Day. It said simply: “Do not despair. Eyes wide open. Strength in numbers. Keep the faith. And stay strong.”

# 1NR---R3---Texas

### Cap T/Case

#### Cap turns case – precapitalist societies accepted gender and sexual fluidity --- anti queer violence is a bourgeois ideology to divide working class people thru the sexual order of the cis-het middle class

Wolf 9 – Associate editor of the International Socialist Review, on the executive committee of the National Equality March, and writer for the Nation, MRZine, Counterpunch, Dissident Voice, and Socialist Worker [Sherry, *Sexuality and Socialism: History, Politics, and Theory of LGBT Liberation*, Haymarket Books, pp. 19-24]

The oppression of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people hasn’t always existed, and neither have LGBT people as a distinct sector of the population. The oppression of all sexual minorities is one of modern capitalism’s myriad contradictions. Capitalism creates the material conditions for men and women to lead autonomous sexual lives, yet it simultaneously seeks to impose heterosexual norms on society to secure the maintenance of the economic social and sexual order. ¶ Famous lesbians such as Melissa Etheridge pack concert venues and out comedian Ellen DeGeneres hosts an Emmy Award-winning syndicated talk show, while homophobic laws defend discrimination on the job and in marriage. LGBT people such as Matthew Shepard are brutally beaten to death by bigots, while public opinion has radically shifted in favor of LGBT civil rights.1 This apparently contradictory state of affairs in the United States can be explained. ¶ LGBT oppression, like women’s oppression, is tied to the centrality of the nuclear family as one of capitalism’s means to both inculcate gender norms and outsource care for the current and future generations of workers at little cost to the state, as explained in detail below. In addition, the oppression of LGBT people under capitalism, like racism and sexism, serves to divide working-class people from one another, especially in their battles for economic and social justice. While capitalist society attempts to pigeonhole people into certain gender roles and sexual behaviors, socialists reject these limitations. Instead, socialists fight for a world in which sexuality is a purely personal matter, without legal or material restrictions of any sort. The right of self-determination for individuals that socialists uphold must include individuals’ freedom to choose their own sexual behavior, appearance, and erotic preferences. ¶ Sexuality, like many other behaviors, is a fluid – not fixed – phenomenon. Homosexuality exists along a continuum. The modern expression of this can be found among the millions of men and women who identify as LGBT – often identifying themselves differently at different times in their lives. There are not two kinds of people in this world, gay and straight. As far as biologists can tell, there is only one human race with a multiplicity of sexual possibilities that can either be frustrated or liberated, depending on the way human society is organized.¶ Reams of historical evidence confirm that what we define today as homosexual behavior has existed for at least thousands of years, and it is logical to assume that homosexual acts have been occurring for as long as human beings have walked the Earth. But it took the Industrial Revolution of the late nineteenth century to create the potential for vast numbers of ordinary people to live outside the nuclear family, allowing for modern gay, lesbian, and bisexual identities to be born. Not until the late twentieth century did some gender-variant people begin to identify themselves as transgender, though people who have defined modern Western concepts of gender-appropriate behavior have existed throughout history in many different cultures. The systematic oppression of LGBT people as it is experienced in most contemporary Western societies, therefore, is also a fairly recent phenomenon in human history. This is not to argue, however, that prior to capitalisms humans existed in a sexual paradise free of repression or restrictions of any kind. Rather, legal prohibition and social taboos from antiquity through the precapitalist era existed in many cultures on the basis of sex acts, often denouncing no-procreative sex, without the condemnation or even the conception of sexual identity as an intrinsic or salient aspect of a person’s being. ¶ Contemporary industrial societies created the possibility for men and women to identify themselves and live as gays and lesbians, argues the collection *Hidden from History*. ¶ What we call “homosexuality” (in the sense of the distinguishing traits of “homosexuals”), for example, was not considered a unified set of acts, much less a set of qualities defining particular persons, in precapitalist societies… Heterosexuals and homosexuals are involved in social “roles” and attitudes which pertain to a particular society, modern capitalism.2 ¶ It was capitalism, in fact, that gave rise to modern individuality and the conditions for people to have intimate lives based on personal desire, a historic break from the power of the feudal church and community that once arranged marriages. Under capitalism, a person’s labor is converted into an individually owned commodity that is bought and sold on the market. Individuals are thrust into completion with each other for work, housing, education, etc., and individual citizens of states are counted in a census and register to vote, or, if they have the means, own property. All of these features of capitalist society established individuality in ways unthinkable under earlier systems like feudalism, creating the potential for a flourishing of sexual autonomy as well. As Karl Marx put it, “In this society of free completion, the individual appears detached from the natural bonds, etc., which in earlier historical periods make him the accessory of a definite and limited human conglomerate.”3 ¶ Historical evidence suggests that homosexual behavior was successfully integrated in many precapitalist cultures. The most famous example is ancient Greece, where sexual relations between older men and teenage boys were heralded as one of the highest forms of love. These relationships, however, were encouraged between wealthier, older, and powerful “betters” and their subordinates who were younger, poorer, or conquered. For the early Greeks and Romans, status and power between lovers were central to their conception of same-sex relations and they held starkly different views of those who played the penetrative role in sex and those who were penetrated. Plutarch, the Greek-born historian of the first century explained, “We class those who enjoy the passive part as belonging to the lowest depth of vice and allow them not the least degree of confidence or respect of friendship.”4 ¶ Many American Indian tribes embraced trans

vestite men and women, known as berdaches, who adopted the gender roles of the “opposite” sex and are sometimes referred to today as “two-spirited” people. A multiplicity of sexual and gender arrangements existed from tribe to tribe, according to anthropologists. Some male berdaches had sex exclusively with other men, though not other berdaches, while some remained celibate, had partners of both sexes, or had exclusively heterosexual sex.5 Gender variance, not sexual preference, defined the berdache, and rather than deriding them for thei gender nonconformity, American Indian tribes saw berdaches as valuable members of their society. One Crow elder explains: “We don’t waste people the way white society does. Every person has their gift.”6 ¶ Even the Roman Catholic Church, until the twelfth century, celebrated love between men. When it ended priestly marriage and enforced chastity, homosexuality was prohibited as well.7 However, in these societies, it was homosexual actions that were tolerated, lauded, or pilloried, not an identifiable category of people. Economic and social conditions had not yet developed in ways that allowed for large numbers of people to acknowledge, express, or explore same-sex desire as a central feature of their lives or their identities. ¶ The French philosopher Michel Foucault challenged modern society’s attempts to superimpose its sexual outlook on the ancients. He argues: ¶ The Greeks did not see love for one’s own sex and love for the other sex as opposites, as two exclusive choices, two radically different types of behavior…. Where the Greeks bisexual then? Yes, if we mean by this that a Greek [free man] could, simultaneously or in turn be enamored by a boy or a girl…. But if we wish to turn our attention to the way in which they conceived of this dual practice, we need to take note of the fact that they did not recognize two kinds of “desire”…. Their way of thinking, what made it possible to desire a man or a woman was simply the appetite that nature had implanted in man’s heart for “beautiful” human beings, whatever their sex.8 ¶ Whereas previous class societies prohibited certain sex acts, the rising capitalist state and its defenders in the fields of medicine, law, and academia stepped in to define and control human sexuality in ways previously unimagined. These nineteenth-century professionals – almost entirely white men – reflected the interests and prejudices of the rising middle class. With economic growth and development the need for higher levels of education for more kinds of jobs, which extended adolescence and removed teenagers from many occupations, thus reducing social interaction between unrelated adults and children. Medical professionals aiming to legitimize their field pathologized masturbation, while legislators encouraged age-of-consent laws and pressed for higher minimum ages for marriage. Homosexual relations between adults and “innocent minors” were outlawed and juveniles were rendered asexual.9 No less a figure than Sigmund Freud, the father of modern psychiatry at the turn of the twentieth century, theorized and popularized the “problem of homosexuality” while transforming heterosexuality into “the norm we all know without ever thinking much about it.”10

#### Criticizing futurism because “time accumulates” for queer folk is the surrender neolib authorizing right-wing take-over – turns case.

Williams & Srnicek 13 (Alex, PhD student at the University of East London, presently at work on a thesis entitled 'Hegemony and Complexity', Nick, PhD candidate in International Relations at the London School of Economics, Co-authors of the forthcoming Folk Politics, 14 May 2013, <http://criticallegalthinking.com/2013/05/14/accelerate-manifesto-for-an-accelerationist-politics/> //shree)

At the begin­ning of the second dec­ade of the Twenty-​First Cen­tury, global civilization faces a new breed of cataclysm. These com­ing apo­ca­lypses ridicule the norms and organ­isa­tional struc­tures of the polit­ics which were forged in the birth of the nation-​state, the rise of cap­it­al­ism, and a Twen­ti­eth Cen­tury of unpre­ced­en­ted wars. 2. Most significant is the break­down of the planetary climatic system. In time, this threatens the continued existence of the present global human population. Though this is the most crit­ical of the threats which face human­ity, a series of lesser but potentially equally destabilising problems exist along­side and inter­sect with it. Terminal resource depletion, especially in water and energy reserves, offers the prospect of mass starvation, collapsing economic paradigms, and new hot and cold wars. Continued financial crisis has led governments to embrace the para­lyz­ing death spiral policies of austerity, privatisation of social welfare services, mass unemployment, and stagnating wages. Increasing automation in production processes includ­ing ‘intel­lec­tual labour’ is evidence of the secular crisis of capitalism, soon to render it incapable of maintaining current standards of living for even the former middle classes of the global north. 3. In con­trast to these ever-​accelerating cata­strophes, today’s politics is beset by an inability to generate the new ideas and modes of organisation necessary to transform our societies to confront and resolve the coming annihilations. While crisis gathers force and speed, politics withers and retreats. In this paralysis of the political imaginary, the future has been cancelled. 4. Since 1979, the hegemonic global political ideology has been neoliberalism, found in some vari­ant through­out the lead­ing eco­nomic powers. In spite of the deep struc­tural chal­lenges the new global prob­lems present to it, most imme­di­ately the credit, fin­an­cial, and fiscal crises since 2007 – 8, neoliberal programmes have only evolved in the sense of deep­en­ing. This continuation of the neo­lib­eral pro­ject, or neo­lib­er­al­ism 2.0, has begun to apply another round of structural adjustments, most sig­ni­fic­antly in the form of encour­aging new and aggress­ive incur­sions by the private sec­tor into what remains of social demo­cratic insti­tu­tions and ser­vices. This is in spite of the immediately negative eco­nomic and social effects of such policies, and the longer term fun­da­mental bar­ri­ers posed by the new global crises. 5. That the forces of right wing governmental, non-​governmental, and corporate power have been able to press forth with neoliberalisation is at least in part a result of the continued para­lysis and ineffectual nature of much what remains of the left. Thirty years of neoliberalism have rendered most left-​leaning political parties bereft of radical thought, hol­lowed out, and without a popular mandate. At best they have responded to our present crises with calls for a return to a Keynesian economics, in spite of the evidence that the very conditions which enabled post-​war social democracy to occur no longer exist. We can­not return to mass industrial-​Fordist labour by fiat, if at all. Even the neo­socialist regimes of South America’s Bolivarian Revolu­tion, whilst heart­en­ing in their abil­ity to res­ist the dog­mas of con­tem­por­ary cap­it­al­ism, remain disappointingly unable to advance an alternative beyond mid-​Twentieth Century socialism. Organised labour, being systematically weakened by the changes wrought in the neo­liberal project, is scler­otic at an insti­tu­tional level and — at best — capable only of mildly mitigating the new structural adjustments. But with no systematic approach to building a new economy, or the structural solidarity to push such changes through, for now labour remains rel­at­ively impotent. The new social movements which emerged since the end of the Cold War, exper­i­en­cing a resur­gence in the years after 2008, have been similarly unable to devise a new political ideological vision. Instead they expend considerable energy on internal direct-​democratic process and affective self-​valorisation over strategic efficacy, and frequently propound a variant of neo-​primitivist localism, as if to oppose the abstract violence of globalised capital with the flimsy and ephemeral “authenticity” of communal immediacy. 6. In the absence of a radically new social, political, organisational, and economic vision the hegemonic powers of the right will continue to be able to push forward their narrow-​minded imaginary, in the face of any and all evidence. At best, the left may be able for a time to partially resist some of the worst incursions. But this is to be Canute against an ultimately irresistible tide. To generate a new left global hegemony entails a recovery of lost possible futures, and indeed the recovery of the future as such.

#### The world is too complex for a cultural reflex to solve – performance as resistance is a bourgeois ideology that distracts from vertical institutional organizing to build global solidarity

Aldama 8 – Arts & Humanities Distinguished Professor at Ohio State University [Frederick Luis, *Why the Humanities Matter: A Commonsense Approach*, University of Texas Press, p. 153-155]

To clear some muddied waters, let me begin by asking, What does language do that bodies don't? At the most basic level, there is a fundamental difference between a body moving to music and that of bodies en masse fighting for political reform. The former is a reflex that can be crafted and recrafted to perform within different sonically sculptured scenes; the latter functions as a phatic, bodily extension to emphasize political demands for radical reform. To put it simply, a body's kinesthetic response to music that can be shaped into dance is not equivalent to language (sign and phatic gesture) that is necessary not just for the survival of the human race, but for the communication needed to build solidarity between proletariat groups worldwide for revolution to take place.

So while the impulse might be to read dancing bodies as counterhegemonic rhythmic cartographies that resist dominant paradigms and articulate a subaltern history, culture, and consciousness, music and/or the body's movement in response to music quite simply does not have the same ontological equivalence as language.

This is not to say that a rhythmic cartography such as Nortec does not cross borders. As the brief discussion of techno above points out, Nortec participates in a rich history of techno's diasporic movements and hybridizing of musical genres. However, this connection to hybridizing at the level of music culture and genre is not to be confused with acts of linguistic communication-whether counterhegemonic or not. Musical rhythms and body movements might jell together and form communities, such as Latinos with salsa or meringue, Tijuanenses and Nortec, thrash metal and white suburban male teenagers, or ska and British underclassers. However, such dance/music cartographies are not text-acts equivalent to the linguistic structures that inform language. They could [END PAGE 153] never be, then, considered the same as the language required for communication in order to build coalition and incite revolution. Nortec, or any dance/music rhythmic cartography, cannot do what is required of hundreds of thousands of people gathered together on the streets to overturn the formation of nation-states by bourgeois elites with its drawing of boundaries, establishment of institutions, and laws (judicial and legislative branches) and government (executive branch) to enforce the material reality of the existence of these borders that delimit the territory within which the ruling class can rule.

So what are we to make of scholars who conflate language and dance/ music compositions?8 What are we to make of the formulation of music/ dance as a counterhegemonic discourse where power is no longer locatable in bourgeois institutional centers used to command, to dominate, to oppress and to exploit in the hands of one social class and its institutions (the State)? Where the text is the world and therefore dance/music is a text invested with the weight of the power that exists in the real of reality.

The tendency of such scholars is to posit these musicscapes as referential, and therefore as potential sites of ontological transformation. Such scholars can theorize music as having a magical power to reterritorialize the restrictive capitalist nation-state because they identify it as a discursively referential construct. However, if the nation-state is neither a textual construct nor an imagined community, but rather the very real drawing up of boundaries, establishment of institutions and laws by a bourgeoisie to enforce the very real and violent oppression of the working class, then we must reassess such declarations. We must reassess the reading given subaltern-identified "rhythmic cartography" or "audiotopia" as referential acts equivalent to speech-acts or text-acts invested with the equivalent power to destabilize a real global capitalism.9

This confusion of a cultural form with ontological fact embraces the type of relativism and constructivism that I stand against at the very outset of this book. Such criticism muddles musical aesthetics and dance compositions with ontological fact that does little to build an understanding of music and its function. As Keith Negus aptly reminds, "Music cannot simply reflect an individual's personality or life, a nation, a city or 'the age we live in'. That word, reflection, is one that slips very easily into both academic discourse and everyday conversations about popular music. But no music can be a mirror and capture events or activities in its melodies, rhythms and voices. The world, a society, an individual life, or even a particular incident, is far too complex for any cultural product [END PAGE 154] (book, film, or song) to be able to capture and spontaneously 'reflect'" (Popular Music in Theory 4).

### AT: Exploitation DA

#### Our argument isn’t that you should ignore gender---this is a strawman that devolves into a lose-lose situation of pure negation of Marxist politics

Asad Haider 18, PhD candidate in the History of Consciousness at UC Santa Cruz, founding Editor of Viewpoint Magazine, interviewed by Daniel Denvir, fellow at Brown University's Watson Institute, 8/14/18, “Mistaking Identity Politics: A Conversation with Asad Haider (Part I),” https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3972-mistaking-identity-politics-a-conversation-with-asad-haider-part-i

One thing we touched on a bit is that often the liberal argument that socialists don't care about race or gender is a straw man — in the case of Hillary Clinton, for — but as you've mentioned earlier and you write in the book, there is a current of what can only fairly be called class-first politics on the left. You argue that it plays into identitarians' hands.

The socialist left has a mixed history on the question, with points high and low. Things did improve, at least initially, with the rise of the Communist Party, where black cadre made the fight against racism central. Explain where the left sometimes falls short today and some of the historical antecedents.

First of all, the history of the labor and socialist movement in the United States is the history also of immigration and immigration from Europe, which is voluntary. But then also the forced immigration, the forced migration of African laborers.

That means that socialism always has a complicated relationship with the process, a long process of what Theodore Allen called the invention of the white race. When immigrants arrive in the United States, they have to make a choice, which is whether they will join up with the labor movement, with IWW, with the Socialist Party, etc., or will they opt to enjoy the privileges that are extended to people who join the club of whiteness and allow them to have some advantage over people who are formerly enslaved?

Now the Socialist Party and other organizations of that kind were not necessarily racist. We could certainly imagine that there were racist members and so on, but they often opposed segregation. They were often in favor of equal rights for black people. But what they didn't understand, in most cases, was that you couldn't have equality and you couldn't have the advancement of the interests of the working class as a whole unless you put anti-racist demands and programs at the center of your political work.

That's what people in the Communist Party started doing, particular figures like the African Blood Brotherhood, which was absorbed into the Communist Party at a certain point. It was founded in 1919, and in a few years was absorbed into the Party. A figure who I talk about a lot, who has a biography with one of the best titles I know of: Black Bolshevik. His name was Harry Haywood.

What he talked about was looking around, he was trying to recruit his friends and black people he knew to the Communist Party because he had an understanding of how racism was produced through the history of American capitalism. And he understood the necessity of having an anti-capitalist program to overcome racism. But it was hard to convince black people of that because they saw an organization that appeared to be primarily white. And they were more drawn to organizations like those of Marcus Garvey, which put demands for self-determination front-and-center.

That's why Haywood went to Moscow and wrote the famous 1928 Comintern Resolution, which said that there's a black nation in the American South, which has the right to take up the demand of self-determination. Lots of people quibble about this, whether it's really correct to say there was a nation in the Black Belt South. This is not the important thing. The important thing is that this was a strategic move to say there is a nationalist demand which is mobilizing a lot of people and Garveyism was a mass movement, and that Communists have to engage with that desire. They have to be able to say that the demand for self-determination can be taken up by a multiracial movement, by a movement which is anti-capitalist. We do not need to yield that to movements which are fundamentally based on an essentialist concept of race and which are opposed to solidarity with other nationalities and other groups.

Coming up to the present, where do actually existing class-first leftists fall short and what is the analysis that's put forward?

First of all, they suppress this history — one of the most precious aspects of the history of Marxism and what made Marxism a global phenomenon in the 20th century. They suppress this history partly because they have Eurocentric blinders, partly because of a really inadequate analysis of what went wrong with actually existing socialism in the 20th century that is popular in the United States.

They misrepresent Marxism to a public which otherwise might potentially be receptive to it. Many activists today look at Marxism as something which says that anti-racist demands are frivolous

or should be subordinated to class demands. And class-based demands will realize anything that an anti-racist demand would do. Like an anti-racist demand is only just a sort of muddled way of expressing what is actually a class demand.

When they do that, when socialists talk like that, they turn off so many people who might otherwise be receptive to the idea of an anti-capitalist and anti-racist movement and they introduce the fuel for this kind of division.

It's sort of a destructive closed circuit, because it seems to me that for some so-called class-first leftists, the root of the analysis is anger at the identitarian argument, such that their counter argument becomes simply its inverse.

That's right and actually that's happened on both sides. The way that people who are now advocating identity politics often operate is based on pure negation of what they perceive to be the class-first position. Everybody loses in the situation.

#### We don’t need an alternative – every link argument is a reason to vote neg on presumption – not because they have to justify change, but because its better to go back to the drawing board and find a better advocacy than accept one that is deeply flawed

Valentic ‘8 Tonci, University of Zagreb, “Symbolic Violence and Global Capitalism,” International Journal of Zizek Studies 2(2)

How to define a form of subjectivity that will be truly revolutionary violence, confronting the inauthentic, excessive and illegitimate violence of the state? One should focus more on those "useless" and "excessive" outbursts of violence which display hatred of the Otherness, in accordance with the post-political multiculturalist universe of tolerance for difference. The problem is that today's "radical democracy" is not "radical" enough: it basically accepts the liberal-capitalist horizon, and the logic of liberal capitalism is so total it makes any alternative unthinkable. Does it ultimately mean that, for example, Zizek offers an alternative which is genuinely progressive and transformative, or does he bring about only the empty negativity of "active nihilism"? Does "doing nothing" means that "resistance is surrender"? Today's Left reacts in a wide variety of ways to the hegemony of global capitalism and its political supplement, liberal democracy. It might accept hegemony but continue to fight for reform within its rules (e.g. Third way) or to do nothing and wait for an outburst of "divine violence". It is not enough to merely reform the existing system; we need to radically transform the world. Of course, Zizek is not a ground-breaking author regarding that issue: many anti-capitalists assert that "capitalism is violent", believing that private property, trade and profit survive only because state (or police) violence defends them and that capitalist economies unavoidably need war to expand. His notion of "systemic" violence also heavily relies on numerous theories on "structural violence" denoting a form of violence in which social institutions kill people slowly by preventing them from meeting their basic needs, leading further to social conflicts. What is really innovative, and in a way provocative, in his book is the idea of passivity: It is "better to do nothing than to engage in localized acts whose ultimate function is to make the system run smoother (acts like providing the space for the multitude of new subjectivities, etc.) The threat today is not passivity, but pseudo-activity, the urge to "be active," to "participate," to mask the Nothingness of what goes on.

People intervene all the time, "do something," academics participate in meaningless "debates," etc., and the truly difficult thing is to step back, to withdraw from it. Those in power often prefer even a "critical" participation, a dialogue, to silence - just to engage us in a "dialogue," to make it sure our ominous passivity is broken." What would then be the most plausible theoretical answer and practical advice regarding this theoretical puzzle in which violence is utterly invisible and does not refer any more to "exertion of physical force in order to injure or abuse", or to intentional and forceful human destruction? We need to rethink it in terms of new biopolitical and biosocial constellation where revolutionary or emancipatory potential might be placed at the same time in the passivity and violent activity. The first step would be, paradoxically, to point out the meaningless of violence, to reject all teleological and theological justifications and empirical analysis, and finally to listen in theoretical silence instead of participating in the noise it constantly produces.